

21 MARCH 1947

I N D E X  
Of  
WITNESSES

<u>Defense' Witnesses</u>	<u>Page</u>
YAMAGUCHI, Juichi (resumed)	18869
Cross by Mr. Tavenner (cont'd)	18869
Redirect by Mr. OHARA	18877
(Witness excused)	18881
KATAKURA, Tadashi	18882
Direct by Mr. T. OKAMOTO	18882
<u>MORNING RECESS</u>	18891
Direct by Mr. T. OKAMOTO (cont'd)	18892
<u>NOON RECESS</u>	18911
Direct by Mr. T. OKAMOTO (cont'd)	18912
<u>AFTERNOON RECESS</u>	18936
Direct by Mr. T. OKAMOTO (cont'd)	18936

1 Friday, 21 March 1947

2 - - -

3  
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
5 FOR THE FAR EAST  
6 Court House of the Tribunal  
7 War Ministry Building  
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,  
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12 Appearances:

13 For the Tribunal, same as before.

14 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

15 For the Defense Section, same as before.

16 - - -

17 (English to Japanese and Japanese  
18 to English interpretation was made by the  
19 Language Section, IMTPE.)  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

YAMAGUCHI

CROSS

S  
p  
r  
a  
t  
t  
&  
Y  
e  
l  
d  
e  
n

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present  
4 except OKAWA and MATSUI. We have a certificate from  
5 the prison surgeon of Sugamo to the effect that MATSUI  
6 is too ill to attend the trial today. The certificate  
7 will be recorded and filed. Both accused are repre-  
8 sented by counsel.

9 Mr. Tavenner.

10 - - -

11 J U I C H I Y A M A G U C H I, called as a witness  
12 on behalf of the defense, resumed the stand and  
13 testified through Japanese interpreters as follows:

14 MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, I have  
15 just a few more questions I would like to ask this  
16 witness.

17 THE PRESIDENT: You told us that at three  
18 o'clock yesterday afternoon, Mr. Tavenner.

19 MR. TAVENNER: Yes.

20 CROSS-EXAMINATION

21 BY MR. TAVENNER (Continued):

22 Q Mr. YAMAGUCHI, you testified in your examina-  
23 tion in chief that KANAI assisted Tsang Shih-i in  
24 making plans for the independence movement. Isn't it  
25 a fact that General Tsang Shih-i refused to help in

YAMAGUCHI

CROSS

1 the establishment of the independence movement.

2 A Tsang Shih-i became chief of the Mukden  
3 government and before the founding of the new state  
4 had established the outline for the organization of  
5 Mukden Province.

6 Q Will you answer my question, please? If  
7 it is not plain to you I will repeat it.

8 After the so-called Mukden Incident, did  
9 not General Tsang Shih-i refuse to take any part in  
10 the establishment of an independent government in  
11 Manchuria regardless of what change of mind may have  
12 come about at a later period?

13 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. OHARA.

14 MR. OHARA: I object, your Honor; nothing  
15 has been mentioned in the course of the direct examin-  
16 ation with regard to Tsang Shih-i.

17 THE INTERPRETER: The witness replied,  
18 according to the reporter, "That is a fact."

19 THE PRESIDENT: The objection would have been  
20 overruled in any event. This man is supposed to tell  
21 us the attitude of certain Chinese and others. He can  
22 be asked about this particular person also.

23 MR. TAVENNER: I am referring to page 18823  
24 of the record as the basis for my cross-examination.

25 Q When this General refused to assist in the



YAMAGUCHI

CROSS

1 establishment of the independent government, was he  
2 arrested?

3 A I do not know of such a fact.

4 Q Do you not know that at the time that he  
5 was installed as governor of the Fengtien to which  
6 you referred that he had to be released from confine-  
7 ment in order to act in that capacity?

8 A I have never heard of it.

9 Q I refer you to the Lytton Report on page 90  
10 and will read this item in the short paragraph, the  
11 second from the top of the page, the last three lines:  
12 "on December 15th, Mr. Yuan Chin-kai was replaced by  
13 General Tsang Shih-yi, who was released from his con-  
14 finement and installed as Governor of Fengtien  
15 Province." Does that refresh your recollection?

16 A I was in Mukden from October 1 but I never  
17 heard that Tsang Shih-i was ever arrested or that he  
18 refused participation in the independence movement--  
19 refused to issue an independence declaration.

20 Q I will read you now the first three lines in  
21 the second paragraph on page 89 of the Lytton Report:  
22 "After General Tsang Shih-yi had refused to help in  
23 the establishment of an independent Government,  
24 another influential Chinese official, Mr. Yuan  
25 Chin-kai, was approached." Does that refresh your

YAMAGUCHI

CROSS

1 recollection?

2 A I did not know of such a condition or state  
3 of affairs.

4 Q Mr. YAMAGUCHI, you have testified that on  
5 the 29th of September, 1931, after the so-called  
6 Mukden Incident you went to Mukden from your home in  
7 Dairen. You stated you went to see Colonel DOHIHARA.  
8 What was the purpose of your visit?

9 A On September 29 I left my home and went to  
10 Mukden. My purpose in making my visit to Colonel  
11 DOHIHARA was as I said yesterday, for the restoration  
12 of the Mukden-Chaoyangchen Railway.

13 Q Colonel DOHIHARA at that time was mayor of  
14 the City of Mukden, was he not?

15 A Yes, he was.

16 Q The Manchurian Railroad Company was being  
17 operated under the terms of a treaty by the company  
18 officials and employees, was it not?

19 A Are you referring to the South Manchurian  
20 Railway?

21 Q Yes.

22 A As you stated, Mr. Prosecutor.

23 Q Then why did you find it necessary to consult  
24 the mayor, who is the present accused DOHIHARA?  
25

A What I referred to was the Mukden-Hailungcheng

YAMAGUCHI

CROSS

1 Railway which is a company unto itself and quite  
2 separate from the South Manchurian Railway.

3 Q Was not this railway a branch of the South  
4 Manchurian Railway Company?

5 A No.

6 Q Was that company being operated by corporate  
7 officers and employees at the time of the Mukden Inci-  
8 dent?

9 A Because and as a result of the incident it  
10 was in a state of suspension.

11 Q My question to you was whether the company  
12 had been operated by its own officers, directors and  
13 employees?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Why did you state in your testimony on page  
16 18819 of the record that you stressed the point that  
17 the restoration of the railroad should be accomplished  
18 not by the Southern Manchurian Railway? I mean if the  
19 two companies were separate what did the South Manchurian  
20 Railway Company have to do with it?

21 A The South Manchurian Railway had no connection  
22 with it.  
23  
24  
25

YAMAGUCHI

CROSS

1           Q   Then what was the importance of your  
2 stressing the point that the restoration should not  
3 be accomplished by the Southern Manchurian Railway  
4 Company?

5           Let me put the question another way:  
6 Who suggested to you that the South Manchurian  
7 Railway Company should undertake the restoration  
8 of the other company?

9           A   Nobody.

10          Q   Then how did you happen to stress this  
11 point if no one had **raised** the question?

12          A   In the past this railway was established  
13 in violation of treaty provisions in competition  
14 with SMR. Correction. This railway had long been  
15 a matter of dispute because it was established in  
16 violation of treaty provisions -- it was alleged to  
17 have been established.

18          Q   What has that to do with your stressing to  
19 Colonel DOHIHARA your view that the restoration  
20 should not be undertaken by the South Manchurian  
21 Railway?

22          A   That is just what I said: because of the  
23 fact that one regime was destroyed. That is what  
24 I said. It was a disputed issue, and one regime  
25 was destroyed; and there was a dangerous situation

YAMAGUCHI

CROSS

1 that this might be carried out unilaterally, and  
2 it was my idea that if this were carried out, this  
3 unilateral action were carried out, this dispute  
4 would give rise to new disputes.

5 Q Did Colonel DOHIHARA send for you?

6 A No.

7 Q As a matter of fact didn't you go to  
8 Colonel DOHIHARA because you knew that Colonel  
9 DOHIHARA was interested in a separatist movement  
10 at that time?

11 A No.

12 Q I understood you to say that Colonel  
13 DOHIHARA entrusted the work of restoration to a  
14 committee entitled, "A Committee for the Maintenance  
15 of Peace and Order." Is that correct?

16 A Yes.

17 Q When did that committee first come into  
18 being?

19 A May I have the name of this committee  
20 repeated?

21 Q "A Committee for the Maintenance of Peace  
22 and Order."

23 A My understanding is that it was the  
24 Mukden Chaoyangchen Railway Peace Preservation  
25 Committee. My recollection is that it was formed



YAMAGUCHI

CROSS

1 on the 2nd of September, 1931. That is a mistake;  
2 the second of October.

3 Q I understand you also went to the accused  
4 ITAGAKI in connection with this so-called autono-  
5 mous renovation?

6 A Yes.

7 Q So that this plan was worked out by you,  
8 the accused, DOHIHARA, and the accused ITAGAKI?

9 A Colonel DOHIHARA was the mayor, and in  
10 that capacity he participated in and supervised  
11 the establishment of the committee, but ITAGAKI  
12 merely expressed his agreement but did not partici-  
13 pate in the drawing up of such a plan.

14 Q Was this the model for other plans?

15 A Yes, it was applied to autonomous restora-  
16 tion, and that was respected.

17 THE MONITOR: In those days the spirit  
18 of autonomous restoration was respected.

19 Q In other words, this was the origin of  
20 the plan for autonomous movements?

21 A I cannot say that was necessarily so.

22 MR. TAVENNER: I have no further questions.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. OHARA.  
24  
25

YAMAGUCHI

REDIRECT

## REDIRECT EXAMINATION

1 BY MR. OHARA:

2 Q Why did you go to Mukden from Dairen on  
3 the 29th of September in 1931?

4 THE PRESIDENT: We have had that three  
5 times. We have had two answers to three questions.  
6 We do not want a third answer.

7 Q Was the Mukden Chaoyangchen Railway a  
8 Chinese railway?

9 A Yes.

10 Q Mr. Witness, you said that you obtained  
11 Colonel ITAGAKI's approval of your plan; to which  
12 plan do you refer?

13 A It was an agreement that this autonomous  
14 restoration would be carried out by the company  
15 employees and a number of shareholders, and that  
16 the army will not obstruct this plan.

17 THE MONITOR: And add, five or six repre-  
18 sentatives.

19 MR. TAVENNER: I object on the ground this  
20 is a matter fully covered in examination in chief  
21 and is merely repetition of what was said at that  
22 time.

23 MR. OHARA: I have put this question to  
24 the witness because the Committee for the Maintenance  
25



YAMAGUCHI

CROSS

1 of Peace and Order referred to by Prosecutor  
2 Tavenner was not understood in its proper light  
3 by the witness, and the witness himself was thinking  
4 about another committee for the same purpose, and  
5 that is why I am trying to clarify the situation.

6 THE MONITOR: That is to say, since  
7 there were two committees for preservation of peace  
8 and order.

9 THE PRESIDENT: The objection is over-  
10 ruled.

11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

YAMAGUCHI

REDIRECT

M  
O  
R  
S  
e  
&  
W  
O  
l  
f

1 Q Mr. Witness, when you were referring to the  
2 Committee for the preservation of the Mukden-Chaoyangchen  
3 Railway to which committee were you referring? Which  
4 committee for the maintenance of peace and order were  
5 you referring to when you spoke of the committee in  
6 connection with that railway?

7 THE MONITOR: When you spoke of having gone  
8 to some place in connection with the plan for the  
9 restoration.

10 THE PRESIDENT: I do not know how any witness  
11 can comprehend the questions put to him in that way. It  
12 is difficult for us to follow him that way. I am not  
13 finding fault with you, Mr. OHARA.

14 Q What motive did you have in establishing this  
15 committee for the restoration of the Mukden-Chaoyangchen  
16 Railway?

17 A No, the purpose was to restore the Mukden-  
18 Chaoyangchen Railway under the Chinese Nationalist flag.

19 Q What was the reason for hastening the restor-  
20 ation of this Railway?

21 A On the one hand Mukden was in dire need of  
22 food supplies. On the other hand, there was danger of  
23 political confusion.

24 Q Yesterday, Prosecutor Tavenner, referring to  
25 Court evidence No. 222 and 223 -- Court exhibit 222 and

YAMAGUCHI

REDIRECT

1 223 asked you, Mr. Witness, whether the resolution of  
2 the Cabinet was not being carried out.

3 THE MONITOR: Yesterday afternoon Prosecutor  
4 Tavenner after having read the Court exhibit 222 and  
5 223 asked you why the decision of the Cabinet was not  
6 carried out. To this, Mr. Witness, you answered that it  
7 was so. Were you saying that the declaration was not  
8 being carried out or it was being carried out?

9 A I think I replied that I did not know anything  
10 about it.

11 THE PRESIDENT: I thought that question was  
12 disallowed.

13 MR. TAVENNER: It was disallowed as to one  
14 document and not as to the other.

15 Q How many committees for the maintenance of peace  
16 were there in Manchuria?

17 THE PRESIDENT: One of the Members of the Court  
18 thinks that Japanese counsel should be reminded that  
19 on redirect they cannot bring out new matters, but only  
20 bring out matters referred to in cross-examination.  
21 Re-examination must be directed to explain something  
22 said in cross-examination.

23 Q Mr. Tavenner yesterday read a passage from the  
24 Lytton Report, page 97, under the heading "Conclusion " --  
25 I apologize, I made a mistake. That was a passage read

YAMAGUCHI

REDIRECT

1 by Mr. President. Mr. President read the passage saying  
2 that "It is clear that the independence movement, which  
3 had never been heard of in Manchuria before September  
4 1931, was only made possible by the presence of the  
5 Japanese troops."

6 Would independence have been impossible without  
7 the presence of the Japanese troops?

8 A I firmly believe that even without the Manchurian  
9 Incident the independence revolution in Manchuria was  
10 inevitable.

11 Q Is that your conviction?

12 THE PRESIDENT: Well, he need not repeat that.

13 MR. TAVENNER: I ask that the answer be struck.

14 THE PRESIDENT: It will be disregarded.

15 MR. OHARA: That concludes the redirect, your  
16 Honor.

17 THE PRESIDENT: This witness is no longer  
18 required. The witness may go on the usual terms.

19 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

20 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. OKAMOTO.

21 MR. T. OKAMOTO: We should like to call the  
22 witness KATAKURA, Tadashi.

23 - - - -  
24  
25

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 T A D A S H I K A T A K U R A, called as a  
2 witness on behalf of the defense, being  
3 first duly sworn, testified through  
4 Japanese interpreters as follows:

## DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. T. OKAMOTO:

Q I ask the name of the witness?

A KATAKURA, Tadashi.

Q Your address?

A 2658 of 5-Chrome Meguro, Meguro Ward, Tokyo.

Q The date of your birth?

A May 18, 1898.

Q What post did you hold at the time of the  
14 termination of the war?

A I was Commander of the 202nd Division.

Q Your rank?

A Major General.

Q Where were you on the 18th of September, 1931,  
19 at the time of the Mukden Incident?

THE MONITOR: Outbreak of the Mukden Incident.

A I was at Port Arthur.

Q What position did you hold -- what were your  
24 duties?A I was attached to the staff of the Kwantung  
25 army. I was assigned to staff duties, Kwantung army.



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 Q In what year did you first go to Manchuria?

2 A August, 1930.

3 Q Until when did you stay in Manchuria?

4 A Until the end of August, 1932.

5 Q Did you journey through Manchuria in 1932 or  
6 thereabouts?

7 A In the fall of 1930 I made a tour of the  
8 eastern part of northern Manchuria, and in the summer  
9 of 1931 the western part of northern Manchuria.

10 Q Are you informed of the Captain NAKAMURA  
11 Incident at that time?

12 THE MONITOR: Did the Incident whereby Captain  
13 NAKAMURA was killed take place at that time?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Did you go to make spot investigations of the  
16 NAKAMURA Incident?

17 A Yes.

18 Q How far did you go?

19 A To the south -- to the Taonan District.

20 Q May I ask the witness to speak in lower voice.

21 What were the results of ~~that~~ investigation?

22 A It was toward the end of June -- 27th of June  
23 to be exact -- that Captain NAKAMURA was killed by  
24 Chinese soldiers in the western part of Taonan.

25 Q When did the army first obtain information about

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 the NAKAMURA Incident?

2 A The early part of July, 1930.

3 Q Was that reported immediately to Central, that is,  
4 Tokyo?

5 A Yes, the Kwantung army reported to the War  
6 Ministry and to the General Staff Headquarters.

7 Q Did the Japanese consulates in Manchuria also  
8 obtain this information?

9 A Yes.

10 Q When?

11 A Generally, about the same time.

12 Q Were any measures taken to search for Captain  
13 NAKAMURA?

14 A I think it was about the 15th of July that the  
15 Harbin Special Service Organ sent out a search network  
16 from Taonan and from Tsi Tsi har.

17 Q Was there any evidence, any clues?

18 A I am not sure, but around the 23rd or 24th of  
19 July we came upon the first most important clue.  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25



KATAKURA

DIRECT

Q What sort of clue was that?

A A Japanese railway official of the South Manchuria Railway in Tsitsihar heard from the mouth of a Chinese returning from Taonan of the killing of Captain NAKAMURA.

Q What measures did the army take concerning this?

A The Kwantung Army sent me to the Taonan area and through military hands we immediately set upon investigation.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, I am sorry to object so frequently but it appears that the entire matter is dealt with in the Lytton Report, pages 63 to 65, inclusive, and to page 66, inclusive, and that this is of a repetitive character. We, therefore, feel we should object to it in the interest of saving time.

MR. T. OKAMOTO: We understand that very well, sir, but according to the Lytton Report it is our impression as if the Lytton Report had represented the army as having utilized something to create this incident and we are trying to give a complete and full explanation of the true details of that incident.

THE MONITOR: Having utilized this incident

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 to create new problems or create an issue.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Well, confine yourself to  
3 what is necessary.

4 Q According to the Lytton Report the news --  
5 the announcement of the NAKAMURA Incident was first  
6 made in August. Was there any reason for this?

7 A At that time there were various matters that  
8 required to be negotiated with China and such negoti-  
9 ations had to be carried on with definite, accurate  
10 evidence; otherwise there was every possibility of  
11 the whole matter being rubbed out by some way or  
12 another. And in order to avoid such possibilities  
13 that we should have in hand accurate definite evidence.

14 Q While you were traveling through Manchuria  
15 what was the situation of the Chinese attitude to  
16 the Japanese at that time as you have witnessed and  
17 experienced?

18 A During my North Manchurian tour, especially  
19 to the east and to the west of that area, as well as  
20 my trip in connection with the investigation of the  
21 Captain NAKAMURA Incident, if I were wearing ordinary  
22 civilian clothes or Chinese clothes I was frequently  
23 molested at the point of bayonets by railroad guards.  
24 That is when I am riding on trains. And frequently  
25 molested by railroad guards while I was riding on

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 trains with pistols. And from the various railway  
2 guards in various parts of Manchuria there were fre-  
3 quent appeals brought to us of the fact that they were  
4 being molested by Chinese -- arrested and interfered  
5 with by Chinese.

6 Q Then I should like to ask you, Mr. Witness,  
7 did you frequently travel in civilian clothes and not  
8 in uniform, or in Chinese clothes?

9 THE INTERPRETER: In civilian or Chinese  
10 clothes and not in military uniform.

11 A It was as a matter of custom to travel out-  
12 side of the railway zone in Chinese or in civilian  
13 clothes.

14 Q At the time how was the guarding of the  
15 railways? How well were the railways guarded at that  
16 time?

17 A The independent railway guard units on the  
18 average patrolled the railways about 3,000 times per  
19 month.

20 Q And what were the results?

21 A And in spite of such patrol duties by our  
22 independent railway units the railway -- operation of  
23 the railway was frequently obstructed, lines cut down  
24 and various other incidents took place.

25 Q What sort of measure was taken on each occasion?

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 A As far as the Kwantung Army was concerned it  
2 was its policy to settle these incidents peacefully  
3 and localize the dispute as much as possible, and this  
4 policy was followed.

5 Q What sort of Japanese organization was respon-  
6 sible for the negotiations?

7 A With respect to military matters, minor  
8 military matters, questions were settled by the Mukden  
9 Special Service Department, and important issues  
10 were handled by the Japanese Consulate-General in  
11 Mukden.

12 Q And the Chinese party to the negotiations?

13 A The staff officers of GHQ of the Chang Hsueh-  
14 liang Army as well as the Liaison Office of Chang's  
15 office.

16 THE MONITOR: Liaison Office of Chang's  
17 regime or government.

18 A (Continuing) And it was customary for the  
19 Mukden Special Service Organ to negotiate with the  
20 GHQ staff of the Chang Hsueh-liang Army while the  
21 Consulate-General negotiated with the Liaison Office  
22 of the Chang Hsueh-liang regime.

23 Q Where were you on the 18th of September 1941?

24 A At Port Arthur.

25 Q At what time did the Mukden Incident break out?

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 THE MONITOR: When did you first hear of the  
2 outbreak of the so-called Mukden Incident or  
3 Liutiaokou Incident?

4 A At 2330 hours of September 18.

5 Q Would you explain the situation immediately  
6 before and immediately after that?

7 A On that day the commanding general of the  
8 Kwantung Army, ISHIHARA, and other staff officers --  
9 HONJO, commanding general of the Kwantung Army General  
10 HONJO, accompanied by General ISHIHARA and other staff  
11 officers of that army, were returning from an inspec-  
12 tion of Liao-Yong and was to arrive by evening. At  
13 Port Arthur there were only the chief of staff, MIYAKE,  
14 myself, and one or two other staff officers.

15 THE MONITOR: Another staff officer instead  
16 of one or two.

17 A (Continuing) That day there was a dinner party  
18 at the Yamoto Hotel in Port Arthur amongst class mated,  
19 that is, Military Academy class mates had a dinner  
20 party at that hotel that evening and I returned home  
21 late and it was 11:30 o'clock in the evening when I  
22 was about to retire that I received the telephone call.  
23 This telephone call came from a captain of the engineers  
24 who was officer of the day, Captain KONISHI. KONISHI  
25 appeared to be very much excited. He told me over the



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 telephone that an unexpected and big incident had  
2 occurred in Mukden and that an important telegram  
3 had arrived and asked me to come to the office right  
4 away. And so I put on my Japanese robe and ran to  
5 the headquarters which is about 2200 meters away. As  
6 soon as I met Captain KONISHI I saw the telegram which  
7 reported that an incident had occurred north of Mukden  
8 at a point called Luitiaokou, that a section of the  
9 railroad had been bombed at that point. Thereupon I  
10 ran 200 meters to the official residence of the chief  
11 of staff, MIYAKE carrying with me the telegram.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Did he say bombed?

13 (Whereupon, the official court reporter  
14 read from the previous answer as follows:

15 "That a section of the railroad had been bombed  
16 at that point."

17 THE WITNESS: Yes, we received the first  
18 report that a section of the railroad north of Mukden  
19 at a point near Luitiaokou had been bombed.

20 THE MONITOR: Mr. President, this is the  
21 Language Section speaking. The term used by the  
22 witness could be interpreted as "bombing" "exploding"  
23 or "destruction by means of explosion" or "blown up."

24 MR. T. OKAMOTO: (In English) It is an  
25 explosion, not bombing. In Japanese it is very clear.

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 THE MONITOR: He said "bakuha." Bakuha means  
2 bombing or destroying.

3 MR. T. OKAMOTO: (In English) No it doesn't.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Take it to the Language  
5 Board if you have any difference of opinion.

6 THE PRESIDENT: You cannot correct him,  
7 Mr. OKAMOTO. That must be done by the witness. The  
8 interpreter can explain his position, though.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Language Section speaking.  
10 We think that "blown up" would be a more apt term.  
11 BY MR. T. OKAMOTO (Continued):

12 Q Than the question arises, why did Captain  
13 KONISHI first inform you of this incident?

14 A At that time my duties were to assist Staff  
15 Officer ITAGAKI in connection with various public  
16 relations work and also in the handling of business  
17 affairs within the general staff office or the staff  
18 office.

19 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen  
20 minutes.

21 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was  
22 taken until 1100, after which the proceedings  
23 were resumed as follows:)  
24  
25



KATAKURA

DIRECT

G  
r  
e  
e  
n  
b  
e  
r  
g

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. OKAMOTO.

4 BY MR. T. OKAMOTO (Continued):

5 Q Mr. Witness, you have just stated that you  
6 went to the residence -- you went to see the chief  
7 of staff. Where was the commander of the Kwantung  
8 Army at that time?

9 A The commanding general of the Kwantung Army  
10 returned to his residence about nine p.m., and he  
11 was, therefore, at home.

12 Q When was the information about the Mukden  
13 Incident relayed to the commanding general?

14 A The report was made directly by telephone  
15 by the chief of staff at about 2340 hours or 2350  
16 hours.

17 Q What was the commanding general doing at  
18 that time?

19 A He was in bath.

20 Q I think your explanation of why Captain,  
21 of the Engineers, KONISHI gave the message to you --  
22 your explanation for the reason why Captain KONISHI  
23 gave the message to you is insufficient --

24 THE MONITOR: Gave the message to you first.

25 Q (Continuing) is still insufficient, so I

KATAKURA

DIRECT

should like to have you give more details of that.

1       A    It was established procedure or custom for  
2 such telegrams to be sent to me first because I was  
3 assistant staff officer in charge of public relations  
4 or liaison work as well as the handling of business  
5 affairs within the Kwantung Army in GHQ.

6       Q    What measures were taken after the informa-  
7 tion was given to the commanding general?

8       A    All staff officers assembled at the resi-  
9 dence of the chief of staff and, from there, together  
10 went to the headquarters of the Kwantung Army and  
11 asked the commanding general to come there.

12       Q    Was there any other information from Mukden  
13 besides this information you first received?

14       A    The chief of staff and other staff officers  
15 were studying the first report at GHQ of the Kwantung  
16 Army when another telegram arrived at the time the  
17 commanding general arrived.

18       Q    Do you remember the contents of this second  
19 telegram?

20       A    Yes, its outline.

21       Q    Would you please give a brief outline of  
22 the telegram?

23       A    The Japanese company at -- this is the  
24 Japanese reading of the place -- Kosekidai was en-  
25

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 gaged in fighting with about three hundred to four  
2 hundred enemy troops, these enemy troops fighting with  
3 machine guns and infantry guns, and that Lieutenant  
4 NODA had been wounded.

5 THE MONITOR: Slight correction: Enemy was  
6 bringing in more machine guns and infantry guns, and  
7 Lieutenant -- First Lieutenant NODA was wounded.

8 A (Continuing) seriously wounded.

9 Q What decision did the Kwantung General make  
10 on hearing this?

11 A The commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army,  
12 with respect to the first report received from Mukden,  
13 said that action should follow the line of operational  
14 plans already established by concentrating the main  
15 forces around Mukden and there wait and see what kind  
16 of moves would be made by the opponent; that, after  
17 receipt of the second report reporting that the enemy  
18 had already increased its forces and that the fighting  
19 had become more widespread, the commanding general  
20 changed the original operations plan by taking the  
21 step of gradually increasing all forces and attacking  
22 the enemy. At this time the commanding general of  
23 the Kwantung Army especially cautioned that, because  
24 the enemy situation in and around Changchun and the  
25 enemy situation in and around Kirin being unknown --

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 he revised the original plan already made in peace-  
2 time which was to try to draw enemy forces toward  
3 Changchun, and stopped plans to draw enemy forces --  
4 and suspended the plan of calling Japanese forces to  
5 Mukden from Changchun.

6 Q On what was General HONJO's plan based --  
7 decision?

8 THE MONITOR: What was the basis for General  
9 HONJO's decision?

10 A That was the underlying principle of the  
11 normal operational plans of the Kwantung Army as well  
12 as the --

13 THE MONITOR: Correction: The decision was  
14 based on the regulations governing the function of  
15 Kwantung Army Headquarters and the operational plans  
16 as drawn up in peacetime.

17 Q I understand in your answer that the opera-  
18 tions taken up, in fact, were quite different from  
19 that drawn up in peacetime.

20 THE MONITOR: Quite different from the plans  
21 drawn up in peacetime.

22 A Yes, there were some differences.

23 Q When did the commanding general leave Port  
24 Arthur?

25 A Between three and three a.m. of September 19 --

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 between three and three-thirty a.m., September 19.

2 Q Then that left Port Arthur empty, did it  
3 not?

4 THE MONITOR: Is that so?

5 A The commanding general of the Kwantung Army,  
6 General HONJO, took staff officer ISHIHARA and the  
7 main body of his staff officers with him as well as  
8 some of his aides, leaving behind most of the direct-  
9 ors of the various departments of the Kwantung Army  
10 General Headquarters, such as the Arms Bureau, the  
11 Ordnance Bureau, the Legal Affairs Bureau, the  
12 Intendance Bureau, et cetera, and left behind chief  
13 of staff MIYAKE to look after -- to do --

14 THE MONITOR: To clear up the business there.

15 A (Continuing) To clear up the business in  
16 Port Arthur.

17 THE MONITOR: Slight correction: Ordnance  
18 Department, Medical Department, Intendance Department  
19 and Legal Department chiefs.

20 Q What were the conditions en route to Mukden?

21 A It appears as if Japanese residents who were  
22 living along the railway lines had heard of the out-  
23 break of the incident, and there were many of them  
24 who desired that this time, if any, they would like  
25 to see this matter satisfactorily -- and settled once



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 and for all. I do not remember where this took place,  
2 but I recall this incident where a Japanese, speaking  
3 to us, said that "If you men are going to handle this  
4 matter in a slipshod and incomplete fashion, then we  
5 shall line up ourselves -- our bodies along the rail-  
6 road, and we want you to run over us when you return."  
7 There were Japanese who spoke to us as emotionally as  
8 this.

9 Q Where did you go after arriving in Mukden?

10 A We arrived in Mukden between eleven-thirty  
11 and twelve o'clock on the 19th, and we established  
12 our command post in the station master's office.

13 Q What did you do then?

14 A Then, in the evening, we transferred our  
15 headquarters to the Totaku Building along the central  
16 boulevard in Mukden and established billets at a  
17 Japanese inn called the "Shinyokan."

18 Q Up to what time did you remain at the head-  
19 quarters at the Totaku Building?

20 A Up to the end of August, 1932.

21 Q Did you receive any instructions from Tokyo  
22 concerning the Mukden Incident?

23 A Yes.

24 Q What sort of instructions were they?

25 A Instructions came by telegram from the chief

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 of the general staff, KANAYA, and the Minister of War,  
2 General MINAMI, at about six p.m. on September 19.

3 Q Do you recall the contents of these telegrams  
4 or the gist of the telegram?

5 A Yes, to some extent.

6 Q Would you give a brief explanation?

7 MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please --

8 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner. The telegrams  
9 are in evidence, are they not?

10 MR. TAVENNER: I do not think the telegrams  
11 to which they refer are; but, if they are, I have no  
12 objection to make, of course. Otherwise, I think the  
13 original telegram should be produced rather than to  
14 rely upon the recollection of this witness.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Several telegrams are in  
16 evidence. To what are you referring, Mr. OKAMOTO?

17 MR. T. OKAMOTO: The originals of these tele-  
18 grams now being referred to are in the Top Secret files  
19 of the War Ministry, and they are already -- and these  
20 files of the War Ministry have been commandeered by the  
21 Supreme Command, and I believe they are already sent  
22 to Washington Document Center. Therefore, we applied  
23 for the subpoena of these documents -- I mean the  
24 file of the War Ministry from the Washington Document  
25 Center, but we have not yet received them.



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 THE PRESIDENT: I am sure the Members of the  
2 Court would like to see all those telegrams, copies  
3 if originals are not available. We are not bound by  
4 technical considerations. Let us hear the contents  
5 subject to getting the copies or the originals later.

6 MR. T. OKAMOTO: We are prepared to submit  
7 to the Tribunal copies of these telegrams, but we  
8 want to confirm that such telegrams existed at that  
9 time, by this witness.

10 THE PRESIDENT: You will have to convince us  
11 that the telegrams were sent. You could do that at  
12 any stage of the defense evidence; but these telegrams  
13 are of the greatest importance if they were, in fact,  
14 sent.

15 MR. T. OKAMOTO: If there is no mechanical  
16 difficulties we could have produced much earlier than  
17 this examination of the witness. Unfortunately, we  
18 are not yet ready to produce it in the court, so I  
19 just want the confirmation of these telegrams being  
20 received by the Kwantung Army.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Do you want him to give the  
22 contents also?

23 MR. T. OKAMOTO: Yes, sir, in order to  
24 confirm -- as there were many telegrams, to identify  
25 what special telegrams are being referred to at

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 present.

2 THE PRESIDENT: It would be a bad thing to  
3 do. This would be quite a bad precedent if we let  
4 him give the contents because it would overcome our  
5 rules. You could do that with every document.

6 If you object to that, I must uphold your  
7 objection because otherwise it will set our rules  
8 aside. You do object?

9 MR. TAVENNER: Yes, sir.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Objection upheld.  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

KATAKURA

DIRECT

D  
u  
d  
a  
&  
W  
h  
a  
l  
e  
n

1 Q Then in that case we shall present the con-  
2 tents of a telegram concerning which we wish to ask--

3 THE MONITOR: In that case we shall present  
4 the contents of the telegram by means of documents  
5 instead of asking this witness.

6 Q Mr. Witness, do you remember what sort of  
7 instructions you received from Tokyo?

8 A Yes.

9 Q What were the instructions, what kind of  
10 instructions were they?

11 A The telegraphic instructions from the War  
12 Minister, General MINAMI, reported the cabinet deci-  
13 sion to follow a plan of not aggravating or extending  
14 the situation, and that they desired, that is, the  
15 government desired that the incident be settled on  
16 the basis of that policy.

17 THE PRESIDENT: That is a violation of the  
18 Court's ruling, no doubt inadvertent.

19 Mr. T. OKAMOTO: I am sorry, your Honor.

20 THE PRESIDENT: That matter will be stricken.

21 Q Then, to change the question, did the witness  
22 meet General TATAKAWA in Mukden?

23 THE MONITOR: Major General TATAKAWA.

24 A Yes, the night of September 19th.

25 Q On what mission did General TATAKAWA come to

KATAKURA

DIRECT

Mukden?

1           A    On the day before the incident, that is,  
2               September 17th, a telegram came from Tokyo to Port  
3               Arthur--

4               MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, may I  
5               interrupt?

6               THE INTERPRETER: The witness said "Major  
7               General TATAKAWA will be dispatched to Mukden," and  
8               that is as far as he went.

9               MR. TAVENNER: It seems that this also is  
10              in violation of your Honor's ruling with regard to  
11              telegrams. We object, and ask that the answer be  
12              struck.

13              MR. BROOKS: Mr. President, may I be heard  
14              specially on this point as American counsel--

15              THE PRESIDENT: No. The objection is upheld,  
16              the answer is stricken. No question about it.

17              We are just as anxious as counsel to hear  
18              the contents of these telegrams, but we must hear  
19              them in the proper way.

20              MR. BROOKS: Could we get this evidence in  
21              by special consideration that if the telegrams are --  
22              if the evidence can be received as soon as the tele-  
23              grams are in that they will confirm that, and if they  
24              do not then it can be stricken?  
25

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 We have had our application in for these  
2 documents for a long time; they are in the hands of  
3 the Allies in Washington, and we have not received  
4 them. They are not here yet. This is the best evi-  
5 dence we have yet.

6 THE PRESIDENT: We refused you permission to  
7 speak, Captain Brooks, and you disregarded our refu-  
8 sal.

9 The rules will be strictly adhered to. The  
10 prosecution can waive them if they wish, but they  
11 haven't done so. Likewise, the defense will be in  
12 position to waive rules if they think fit. There is  
13 no discrimination in favor of the prosecution.

14 Q To continue my questioning. I asked the  
15 witness what measures did the Kwantung Army take con-  
16 cerning the arrival in Manchuria of Major General  
17 TATAKAWA?

18 A The commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army,  
19 General HONJO, sent Colonel ITAGAKI from Liaoyang to  
20 receive the arrival of Major General TATAKAWA at  
21 Mukden.

22 Q How did you meet General TATAKAWA?

23 A On the night of the 19th, because there were  
24 various telegrams coming from Tokyo, we held a con-  
25 ference of staff officers, and I was ordered to bring



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 General TATAKAWA to this meeting to hear his opinion  
2 because he happened to be in Mukden.

3 Q What did you do then?

4 A I did not know where General TATAKAWA was,  
5 and it took me a long time trying to seek him out, and  
6 late that night I finally located him. Thereupon, I  
7 asked General TATAKAWA to come to the Shinyokan, Japan-  
8 ese inn, and took him on the same car to that place  
9 around midnight.

10 Q What did General TATAKAWA say?

11 A When I first met him he said that he had  
12 arrived just only yesterday and that he had seen  
13 ITAGAKI. But meanwhile the Manchurian Incident --  
14 an incident had broken out and he couldn't do any-  
15 thing about it. And, therefore, he was waiting --  
16 he was planning to see the commanding general of the  
17 Kwantung Army as he was arriving the following day --  
18 that he was unable to do anything about the outbreak  
19 of that incident, but that he was going to speak --  
20 talk with the commanding general of the Kwantung Army  
21 inasmuch as the Kwantung Army general headquarters  
22 was moving up the following day.

23 Q What else?

24 A Thereupon, General TATAKAWA went with me in  
25 my car to the Shinyokan, the Japanese inn, and talked

KATAKURA

DIRECT

with the staff officers who were assembled there.

1 Q What was the contents of the talks?

2 A Speaking of the gist of what General TATA-  
3 KAWA said, he strongly stressed the fact that although  
4 the outbreak of the incident was extremely unfortunate  
5 and regrettable the Kwantung Army, no matter what the  
6 Chinese did or might do, should not move its forces  
7 into northern Manchuria.

8 Q Was his opinion in agreement with that of  
9 the Kwantung Army?

10 MR. TAVENNER: I would like to interrupt,  
11 your Honor. That is an opinion question of such bad  
12 character, and extreme character, that I think we  
13 should object, although opinion evidence has been going  
14 in for some time.

15 MR. T. OKAMOTO: I take back that question,  
16 your Honor.

17 Q Did Major General TATAKAWA see the commanding  
18 general?

19 A Yes, early in the morning of the 20th.

20 Q Do you remember, Mr. Witness, what was the  
21 opinion of Tokyo--

22 THE MONITOR: Did you know what was the  
23 policy of Tokyo by these conferences and information  
24 you received?  
25

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1           A    Yes.

2           Q    What were they?

3               MR. TAVENNER: Your Honor--

4               THE PRESIDENT: He can tell us what he learned  
5 in conference, what was said and what was done.

6               MR. TAVENNER: Yes.

7               THE PRESIDENT: But he can't interpret. The  
8 witness may say what was said in conference, and what  
9 was done there.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 Q Then I ask you, Mr. Witness, during these  
2 conferences what did you learn about -- what was said  
3 about the opinion from Tokyo?

4 THE MONITOR: No -- policy of Tokyo; what was  
5 said about the policy of Tokyo?

6 A Are you referring to the talk held on the  
7 night of the 19th?

8 Q Yes.

9 A With respect to the talk with General  
10 TATEKAWA on the night of the 19th, he said, as I have  
11 said before, that no matter what situation developed,  
12 no matter what the Chinese do or might do, Japanese  
13 forces should not be sent into northern Manchuria.

14 Q To avoid confusing the issue, I shall change  
15 the question. The Kwantung Army sent its forces into  
16 Kirin Province. Why was that done?

17 THE MONITOR: Sent troops into Kirin area  
18 right after the outbreak of the incident. What were  
19 the reasons?

20 THE PRESIDENT: Does he speak for the Kwantung  
21 Army? He will have to tell us what he heard, or what  
22 he heard from those who did. Did the commander-in-chief  
23 tell him the reason?

24 Q Did the witness hear anything from the  
25 commanding general or the chief of staff or the staff

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 officers of the reasons why the troops were sent to  
2 Kirin Province -- to the Kirin area?

3 A Besides assisting Staff Officer ITAGAKI at the  
4 headquarters of the Kwantung Army, I was also perform-  
5 ing the role somewhat in the nature of a chief secre-  
6 tary to the commanding general and to the chief of  
7 staff, and, therefore, I was in the position to be  
8 informed of nearly or almost all things.

9 Q Then, would you please tell us of the dis-  
10 patch of troops to Kirin?

11 A On the 20th of September there was a request  
12 from the president of the Kirin Residents Association  
13 and the adviser of the Kirin Provincial Government  
14 that because -- adviser of the Kirin Army that because  
15 of the state of unrest existing in that area they  
16 would like to have the dispatch of troops into that  
17 area. At that time, Lieutenant Colonel ISHIHARA, who  
18 was staff officer in charge of operations, contended  
19 in favor of the dispatch of armed forces, but the  
20 commanding general of the Kwantung Army did not  
21 approve -- would not approve.

22 Q Was there any reason why the commander-in-chief  
23 objected to the dispatch of troops? If you were told  
24 of the reasons, would you please inform us now?  
25

A Yes, I have heard personally.



KATAKURA

DIRECT

Q Will you please give them now?

1 A General HONJO, in accordance with the policy  
2 sent from the central authorities, that of non-  
3 aggravation and non-extension of the incident, desired  
4 to settle the issue as peacefully and with as much  
5 reason and moderation as possible. However, in view  
6 of the state of disorder and unrest existing in Kirin  
7 Province and because of the state of unrest of the  
8 residents in that province, and because of the  
9 necessity for the protection of the Japanese residents  
10 in that area, it was believed that an early settlement  
11 of the situation in Kirin would bring about a situation  
12 which would enable a more -- to bring about a more  
13 effective protection of the railways in that area, as  
14 well as to secure the safety of Japanese residents  
15 in that area. And in view of the fact that if these  
16 forces were withdrawn immediately upon the settle-  
17 ment of the situation there, that would be in accord  
18 with the policy of non-aggravation and non-extension  
19 and, therefore, would be in line with the policy of  
20 the Japanese Government. Taking these matters into  
21 account, General HONJO gave his decision to dispatch  
22 troops.  
23

24 Q What measure was taken after the dispatch of  
25 troops to Kirin?

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1           A    I think it was around the 23d or the 24th of  
2   September most of the forces of the Kwantung Army were  
3   withdrawn into the railway zone. Then the commanding  
4   general issued instructions in which he gave comfort  
5   to the soldiers for the efforts they had made after  
6   the outbreak of the incident, and also to insure a  
7   stricter discipline in the ranks, and also ordered  
8   the making of preparations and also issued instructions  
9   to make various instructions and to clean up any  
10   unfinished matter.

11           THE MONITOR: Make various "preparations"  
12   instead of "instructions."

13           Q    Were there any instructions from Tokyo at  
14   that time?

15           A    The chief of the Army General Staff, General  
16   KANAYA, said by wire that since the incident had been  
17   more or less settled for the time being, he would  
18   like the Kwantung Army hereafter to take any action  
19   after making proper contact and consultations with the  
20   central authorities.

21           Q    What were the conditions in Harbin at that  
22   time with respect to law and order?

23           A    We learned that the state of law and order  
24   was becoming worse and worse from around the 20th of  
25   September from the Harbin Special Service Department

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 and the Japanese Consulate General in Harbin. To give  
2 a few concrete examples: From about the 20th of  
3 September it was reported that Chinese armies, defeated  
4 Chinese armies, retreating from Changchung in the  
5 direction of Harbin had engaged in various riotous  
6 activities or that there were various anti-Japanese  
7 posters pasted in various localities or that hand  
8 grenades were thrown at the Bank of Chosen, Japanese  
9 Press and other establishments.

10 THE MONITOR: Japanese Press and Consulate  
11 General.

12 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until  
13 half-past one.

14 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was  
15 taken.)  
16

17 - - - -  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

KATAKURA

DIRECT

S  
p  
r  
a  
t  
t  
&  
Y  
e  
l  
d  
e  
n

## AFTERNOON SESSION

The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330, Justice Delfin Jaranilla, Member from the Commonwealth of the Philippines, not sitting.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. OKAMOTO.

- - -

T A D A S H I K A T A K U R A, called as a witness on behalf of the defense, resumed the stand and testified through Japanese interpreters as follows:

MR. T. OKAMOTO: Mr. President, may I get from the court reporter how far we had gone before the recess, whether the witness gave answer or not.

THE PRESIDENT: He got as far as two sentences. I do not know whether he completed his answer or not.

(Whereupon, the last question and answer were read both in Japanese and English.)

## DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. T. OKAMOTO (Continued):

Q Then what information or requests were received from Harbin?

A I think it was around the 22 or 23 of September that a request came from the Special Service

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 Department of Harbin and the Japanese Consul General  
2 at Harbin that in view of the fact that the situation  
3 was extremely acute they would like to have a dispatch  
4 of troops in order to safeguard that area; that is,  
5 dispatch of a part of the troops for that purpose.

6 Q What action did the Kwantung Army take then?

7 A As far as the Kwantung Army was concerned,  
8 in the light of what the Chief of the First Division  
9 of the General Staff, namely, Major General TATEKAWA,  
10 had told us about advancing troops into Northern  
11 Manchuria, and in the light of the instructions from  
12 the Chief of the Army General Staff, General  
13 KANAYA, from Tokyo asking that actions to be taken  
14 henceforth by the Kwantung Army be made after consulta-  
15 tion and contact with the Central Army authorities;  
16 however, because of the frequent requests sent to the  
17 Kwantung Army from Harbin, the Kwantung Army sent to  
18 the Central Army authorities for their views on what  
19 actions to take.

20 Q Were any replies given to that inquiry from  
21 Tokyo?

22 A Instructions were received from the War  
23 Minister, General SUGIYAMA -- Vice War Minister SUGIYAMA --  
24 that troops would not be dispatched to the Harbin area  
25 for the purpose of safeguarding that particular area.



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 Q Will you speak in a low voice, please, Mr.  
2 Witness?

3 Then what action did the Kwantung Army take?

4 A However, I think it was around the 24th of  
5 the same month that another and I think this was the  
6 third request came from the Harbin Special Service  
7 Department and the Japanese Consul General and there-  
8 upon as our final inquiry we asked the War Minister  
9 MINAMI and the Chief of the Army General Staff, KANAYA,  
10 for their permission to dispatch troops.

11 Q What reply was received then from the Central  
12 Army authorities?

13 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

14 MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, it is  
15 quite apparent that the witness is testifying regard-  
16 ing the telegraphic messages that were referred to  
17 this morning and I for that reason make an objection  
18 and ask that these answers be stricken.

19 MR. T. OKAMOTO: I think, your Honor, the  
20 witness should be allowed to testify what information  
21 he received in the course of his duty from Tokyo.

22 THE PRESIDENT: I do not know just how this  
23 is going to be used. Suppose a telegram was received  
24 and read out at the time; he could tell us what was  
25 read out. He could tell us what somebody who received

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 the telegram said was in it.

2 MR. TAVENNER: I would like to remind your  
3 Honor that the witness said he saw the telegrams and  
4 he endeavored, or rather started to state to the  
5 Tribunal the contents of those telegrams.

6 THE PRESIDENT: That he cannot do but if he  
7 said, "I read the telegram to General HONJO and this  
8 is how it read; this is what I said to General HONJO,"  
9 or whatever his name was, he can give it. There is a  
10 fine distinction but it is there, because then he is  
11 only testifying as to what was said on that occasion  
12 and we cannot stop him. It seems inevitable that the  
13 contents of the telegram were read out at the time  
14 but did he hear them?

15 BY MR. T. OKAMOTO (Continuing):

16 Q Then, Mr. Witness, I will ask you in this  
17 way--

18 THE PRESIDENT: Do not lead him.

19 Q You testified that in answer to one of my  
20 last questions you are in charge of receiving telegrams;  
21 is that correct?  
22

23 A As I have said before, it was customary for  
24 me to receive personally and bring personally all im-  
25 portant telegrams addressed to the Commander-in-Chief  
of the Kwantung Army and also the Chief of Staff of the

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 Kwantung Army except those pertaining to personal  
2 matters.

3 Q Were those coded telegrams; were all those  
4 telegrams in code?

5 A They were telegrams in code, and important  
6 coded telegrams were decoded by an extra secretary of  
7 the Kwantung Army by the name of NAKAMURA and he  
8 personally brought me the decoded telegrams.

9 Q Then may I understand that the witness was  
10 familiar generally with the contents of the telegrams--  
11 very familiar?

12 A Yes, brief and important telegrams I am  
13 familiar in general.

14 Q Now, concerning the telegrams coming from  
15 the Central authorities on the question of the dis-  
16 patch of troops to Harbin, did you receive that tele-  
17 gram and deliver -- and read it to the Commander-in-  
18 Chief personally?  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 THE PRESIDENT: Now at this stage, Mr.  
2 Tavenner, I would like you to argue this point.

3 I said that if the telegram was read out  
4 and this witness heard it read out or himself read  
5 it out he could tell us what he read or what he  
6 heard read. Do you contest that?

7 MR. TAVENNER: Yes, sir.

8 THE PRESIDENT: He is testifying to an  
9 event, to something that was said, and you can  
10 always give everything that was said or done.

11 MR. TAVENNER: I think your Honor that  
12 this question is undoubtedly aimed at obtaining  
13 the context of the telegrams.

14 THE PRESIDENT: We are not concerned with  
15 motives here. We could never investigate them.  
16 If that telegram was read out at the time and this  
17 witness heard it read out or himself read it out  
18 he can say what was read. That is my view. I do  
19 not think it is contestable; I do not think it is  
20 arguable.

21 MR. TAVENNER: Of course if that is the  
22 ruling of the Tribunal, I have nothing to say.

23 THE PRESIDENT: No, I want it argued for  
24 the benefit of one of the judges.

25 MR. TAVENNER: Yes. If the Tribunal will



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 recall, the entire purpose of the question was to  
2 obtain from this witness a description of the con-  
3 tents of the telegrams involved. Now a device is  
4 being used to attempt to make the same information  
5 admissible on the theory that the telegram was read.  
6 The best evidence rule would require the production  
7 of the telegram.

8 THE PRESIDENT: No, he is saying what  
9 passed between General HONJO and somebody else.  
10 He can say what was read to General HONJO, among  
11 other things. There is no question about it; I  
12 think it is as plain as a, b, c. It is elementary  
13 to me, at all events. The point is, as Lord  
14 Patrick reminds me, he can say what passed between  
15 HONJO and somebody else as a matter of fact; but  
16 it would not be proof of the contents of the  
17 telegrams if they are in issue; and it is not for  
18 us to investigate counsel's motives in tendering  
19 them. You only guess what his motive or his  
20 purpose is.

21 Objection overruled.

22 MR. TAVENNER: May I address another remark to  
23 the Court not on the question involved?

24 THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is it?

25 MR. TAVENNER: Counsel stated at the time



KATAMURA

DIRECT

1 this question first arose that because of mechanical  
2 troubles they had not presented these telegrams; in  
3 fact I am reminded that the statement was made that  
4 they had copies of them. I think in view of the  
5 fact that this witness is attempting to describe  
6 the contents of the telegrams, if they have copies  
7 we should be presented with them.

8 THE PRESIDENT: That will be necessary  
9 when he comes to prove the contents, what was in  
10 the telegrams. At present he is in a position to  
11 state what passed between him and the Commander  
12 in Chief. He says he was in the position of a  
13 secretary. It is inevitable that if he received  
14 those telegrams he would have read them out; I  
15 should think so. He could have passed them on  
16 without reading them, but they were decoded ap-  
17 parently by him.

18 MR. TAVENNER: No, sir, not by him.

19 THE PRESIDENT: By somebody. However,  
20 that is the decision of the Court.

21 MR. TAVENNER: Yes, sir.

22 MR. T. OKAMOTO: For the information of  
23 the Tribunal and also to the prosecution -- in  
24 reply to the prosecution, May I state that we have  
25 first obtained the copy of these telegrams from the

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 prosecution document, that is --

2 THE PRESIDENT: Prosecution exhibits?

3 MR. T. OKAMOTO: No. These are documents  
4 produced by the prosecution and distributed among  
5 the defense but not introduced to the Court.

6 MR. TAVENNER: Your Honor, they have copies  
7 of them, and there would be little difficulty in  
8 pointing out to us, I should think, the telegrams  
9 that they have in mind.

10 MR. T. OKAMOTO: I shall be glad to  
11 explain the situation. The prosecution document  
12 No. 1641 was delivered to the defense sometime  
13 last year, but the English version did not contain  
14 the contents of the telegrams now referred to; but  
15 the Japanese version -- I mean the copy of the  
16 original Japanese version contained the contents  
17 of the telegrams.

18 THE PRESIDENT: The Japanese version in  
19 the possession of the prosecution; is that what  
20 you mean?  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

KATAKURA

DIRECT

K  
a  
p  
l  
e  
a  
u  
&  
G  
o  
l  
d  
b  
e  
r  
g

1 MR. T. OKAMOTO: No. I shall explain  
2 again. Both the Japanese version and English ver-  
3 sion were distributed to the defense, but the  
4 English version was not complete, so we found  
5 out from the Japanese version that such telegrams  
6 contained in such document -- We tried every means  
7 to find out where the original was, but we were  
8 unable to do so because, I heard -- it may be a  
9 mistake or not; I don't know -- Judge Mackenzie took  
10 them along to Washington -- I don't know -- or some-  
11 where else out of the Court; so therefore --

12 THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is a serious  
13 allegation, to say they were taken out of the  
14 possession of the Court. I don't think you mean  
15 that. That could only mean if they were exhibits.

16 MR. T. OKAMOTO: No. I am sorry to have  
17 used the word "Court"; but it is from the store room  
18 of the prosecution section.

19 THE PRESIDENT: We have no control over  
20 that.

21 MR. T. OKAMOTO: And perhaps I may be allowed  
22 to add that this document, 1641, was not presented  
23 to the Tribunal as evidence. That is the situation  
24 we are facing now.  
25

I sent this Japanese version, distributed

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 from the prosecution to the translation section  
2 last year. We have not yet received the transla-  
3 tion thereof yet.

4 MR. TAVENNER: Certainly counsel doesn't  
5 mean he sent it to the prosecution for translation  
6 a year ago.

7 THE PRESIDENT: The Court has power to  
8 order production of documents, and if an application  
9 is made in Chambers it can be dealt with there. I  
10 have made numerous orders to that effect under the  
11 Charter, which expressly provides for it. But I  
12 would have to be satisfied of the existence of the  
13 document.

14 MR. TAVENNER: The prosecution would like  
15 to make such a request this afternoon.

16 Q Now continuing my last question: Would  
17 you state your understanding of the purport of the  
18 telegram when you took the telegram to the Chief of  
19 Staff KANAYA -- telegram from Chief. of Staff  
20 KANAYA to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung  
21 Army.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Was the telegram read out  
23 to anybody?

24 THE WITNESS: I showed the telegram to  
25 staff officers ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA and the Chief



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 of Staff MIYAKE and the Commanding General of the  
2 Kwantung Army, General HONJO, and received their  
3 signature.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Was it read out?

5 THE WITNESS: I handed the telegram per-  
6 sonally to the Commanding General, HONJO, and spoke  
7 of the gist of the telegram to him, and also showed  
8 the telegram to the various officers concerned,  
9 and these various officers, which I previously named,  
10 read the telegram.

11 THE PRESIDENT: What did you say to General  
12 HONJO? Can you remember the words you used?

13 THE WITNESS: I reported to General HONJO  
14 that the chief of the general army -- General Staff,  
15 KANAYA, had sent instructions stating that troops  
16 should not be despatched to Harbin.

17 MR. T. OKAMOTO: Thank you, your Honor.

18 Q Had any other telegrams been received from  
19 Tokyo other than that telegram in question?

20 A Directions came from War Minister MINAMI.

21 Q Did the witness read that telegram out to  
22 some one?

23 A These telegrams were also shown to my super-  
24 ior officers in the same manner, and I personally  
25 gave the gist thereof.



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 THE PRESIDENT: What was the gist of it?  
2 What did you say, rather, to your superior officer,  
3 if you can recollect?

4 THE WITNESS: Regarding the despatch of  
5 troops to Harbin, instructions were already -- had  
6 already been received from the Prime Minister that  
7 it was the policy not to protect the area, and that  
8 this matter had been reported to the Emperor.

9 Q What measures did the Commander-in-Chief  
10 of the Kwantung Army take then?

11 A In spite of the frequent requests from the  
12 special service organ in Harbin and the Counsel  
13 General in Harbin, in the light of the instructions  
14 from the central authorities the Commander-in-Chief  
15 abandoned the idea of despatching troops, that is,  
16 abandoned the aim of defending or protecting the  
17 area.

18 Q Were there any telegrams received from  
19 Tokyo at that time with respect to the matters  
20 pertaining to military administration?

21 A On or about the 20th of December -- of  
22 September a telegraphic instruction was received  
23 from the Vice-War Minister under orders from the  
24 War Minister, to the effect that there was rumor  
25 afloat that military administration was being carried  
out in Manchuria but that such a step should not

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 be taken.

2 Q What step did the Kwantung Army take then?

3 A As for the Kwantung Army, because the  
4 directive from Tokyo was rather unexpected, it  
5 immediately set upon investigating.

6 Q What were the results? What was dis-  
7 covered as a result of the investigation?

8 A As a result of our investigation it was  
9 discovered that the fact that the IWATA Battalion  
10 in Yinkow, by guiding the Chinese on the spot for  
11 purposes of maintaining law and order, had been  
12 misinterpreted as military administration, and  
13 reported by the press as such.

14 This place known as Yinkow was a place  
15 where the Japanese for the first time established  
16 military administration early during the Russo-Japa-  
17 nese War, and after the outbreak of the Incident  
18 the IWATA Battalion went in and guided the local  
19 authorities in establishing law and order in the  
20 administration of government. This fact was mis-  
21 interpreted as military administration and reported  
22 as such by the press.  
23  
24  
25

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 Q What action did the Kwantung Army take?

2 THE MONITOR: What did the Army on its part  
3 do?

4 A At the order and desire of the Commanding  
5 General of the Kwantung Army HONJO the Chief of  
6 Staff MIYAKE instructed various units to -- cautioned  
7 various units to be careful that any of its actions  
8 would not be interpreted as military administration  
9 and reported the details of the situation to Tokyo.

10 Q Are you familiar with the reports made to  
11 the Central Army authorities?

12 A I am familiar.

13 Q Was it not the fact that Colonel DOIHARA  
14 became the Mayor of Mukden against the principle of  
15 that report?

16 A I firmly believe that it is not contrary  
17 to the principle.

18 Q Did you ever hear either from the Chief of  
19 Staff or the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army  
20 about the reasons for appointing Colonel DOIHARA as  
21 Mayor of Mukden?

22 A Yes.

23 Q What did you hear?

24 A At that time there were many and various  
25 Chinese public establishments and facilities in Mukden

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 as well as various Chinese organizations, but most  
2 of the Chinese leaders had abandoned that locality.  
3 Inasmuch as Mukden was the center of Manchuria,  
4 efforts were first directed towards establishing law  
5 and order in that area. Colonel DOIHARA was appointed  
6 Mayor of the city temporarily on the condition that  
7 he would serve in that position until a competent  
8 person could be found to fill that position.

9 Q Were there any other military men who were --  
10 who participated in the administration of the City  
11 of Mukden other than Colonel DOIHARA?  
12

13 A Not military men.

14 Q Were there any Japanese men?

15 THE MONITOR: Japanese civilians.

16 A The president of the Japanese Residents  
17 Association and several others participated as  
18 councilors.

19 Q Were there any cases of the participation  
20 of either Japanese military men or civilians in the  
21 administration of the Province of Mukden?

22 A Generally speaking, whenever law and order  
23 broke down in China, the first thing that was formed  
24 was a committee for the preservation and maintenance  
25 of law and order. In this case the Liaoning Committee  
for the Preservation of Law and Order was created.



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1           The Chairman of the Liaoning Committee for  
2           the Maintenance of Peace and Order was Yuan Chin Kai  
3           and committeemen consisted of some Japanese.

4           Q   Who recommended or appointed Yuan Chin Kai  
5           as Chairman of the Councilors of the Committee?

6           A   Important Chinese leaders in Mukden.

7           Q   Was the Kwantung Army connected in any  
8           way with that event?

9           A   In my knowledge there was no connection  
10          whatsoever.

11          Q   Have you ever met Mr. Yuan Chin Kai?

12          A   Yes.

13          Q   When was it?

14          A   I met him for the first time when he called  
15          upon the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army  
16          in the early part of October.

17          Q   Do you mean in 1931?

18          A   Yes, 1931.

19          Q   Do you know the character of this man Yuan  
20          Chin Kai?

21          A   Yuan Chin Kai was known in the northern --  
22          northeastern area together with Wang Yung Chiang  
23          and Yu Chung Shan as one of the three civilian  
24          officials.  
25

          Q   What positions did they occupy prior to that



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 time?

2 A He was Vice-President of the Northeastern  
3 Political Council under Chang Hsueh Liang.

4 Q What were the relations between the Kwantung  
5 Army and the Peace Preservation Committee?

6 A As for the Kwantung Army, as I have said  
7 before, because we were opposed to the establishment  
8 of military administration -- but in view of the  
9 fact that the preservation of law and order was an  
10 important matter, we cooperated with the various  
11 organs on the spot and maintained close contacts.

12 Q Did you mean by maintaining contact that  
13 orders were given to them or something else was done?

14 A No orders were issued, but by their cooper-  
15 ation we sought the maintenance of law and order.

16 Q At that time were there any changes in the  
17 constitution or composition of the headquarters in  
18 Mukden?

19 A Soon after the outbreak of the incident  
20 a few men were immediately dispatched there and  
21 other men were called up from time to time and  
22 gradually a staff office or staff department was  
23 established there.

24 Q Would you explain briefly how it was consti-  
25 tuted?

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1           A    At first the staff office consisted of  
2 staff officer ITAGAKI, me, and others totalling  
3 six in all. Because there was in existence at that  
4 time the Investigation Section personnel from this  
5 section was brought in and the General Affairs  
6 Department consisting of Section One, Section Two,  
7 Section Three and later on Section Four was created.

8                   At first ITAGAKI was Chief of the General  
9 Affairs Department and I assisted him. As a staff  
10 officer I was assistant to ITAGAKI.

11                   First Section was devoted to operations  
12 the chief of which was ISHIHARA, Lieutenant Colonel.

13                   The Second Section was devoted to intelli-  
14 gence; the Third Section to matters pertaining to  
15 law and order; Fourth Section with respect to press  
16 matters.

17           Q    Did anyone come from Tokyo -- anyone or any  
18 ones come from Tokyo to inspect that area at the time?

19           A    On or about the 22nd of September ANDO, Chief  
20 of the Military Service Section came to Manchuria at  
21 the orders of the War Minister.

22           Q    What was his business?

23           A    Chief of the Military Service Section ANDO  
24 came at the orders of the War Ministry to investigate  
25 four problems.

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 Q Did the witness hear anything from Colonel  
2 ANDO concerning those four questions?

3 A Yes, I am familiar because as soon as  
4 Colonel ANDO reached Mukden he met the Commanding  
5 General HONJO, Chief of Staff MIYAKE, Colonel ITAGAKI,  
6 Lieutenant Colonel ISHIHARA, me, and one other and  
7 reported his investigation there.

8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

KATAKURA

DIRECT

W  
O  
L  
F  
&  
M  
O  
R  
S  
E

1 Q What were the four questions of Colonel ANDO?

2 A The first question related to a situation  
3 with respect to the guarding and patrolling the Fushun  
4 of which the central authorities were quite concerned.  
5 The second question that he was instructed to investi-  
6 gate into was the fact that -- was the report that  
7 the Kwantung Army had attacked the Chinese in spite  
8 of the fact that on the 18th of September -- night of  
9 the 18th of September the Chinese troops had declared  
10 non-resistance. The third question was investigation  
11 into the report that a certain staff officer in a  
12 telephone conversation with the Japanese Consul-  
13 General in Mukden had used very offensive words and  
14 that he was to investigate into the attitude taken by  
15 that particular officer. The fourth question related  
16 to investigation into operational matters because with  
17 the outbreak of the Incident it was said that the  
18 actions of the Kwantung Army had been taken so swiftly  
19 that it appeared that preparations had been made in  
20 peace time -- from peace time.

21 Q Will you explain more fully the first point  
22 relating to Fushun -- with respect to the Fushun  
23 Company?

24 A At that time there was one company stationed  
25 in Fushun under an army captain KAWAKAMI, Seichi.



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1     Around the middle of September Captain KAWAKAMI  
2     assembled together various officials connected with  
3     the SMR and other companies and made an important  
4     proposal.

5             Q     Then what happened?

6             A     In the presence of these men that he had  
7     assembled, Captain KAWAKAMI said that on or about the  
8     16th or 17th of September the second investigation  
9     squad probing into the cause of the Captain NAKAMURA  
10    Incident would return and depending upon the move that  
11    might be made by the Chinese said a very acute situ-  
12    ation might result, and inasmuch as no preparations  
13    had been made for any trains at Fushun some arrange-  
14    ment ought to be made. Various circles who heard of  
15    this were very much astonished and surprised, especially  
16    the South Manchuria Railway dispatched one of its  
17    directors to Fushun one or two days later to confirm  
18    the reported meeting or proposal of Captain KAWAKAMI.  
19    However, this director of the South Manchuria Railway  
20    returned to Darien because on the 17th he had heard  
21    that there was nothing much in the offing.

22                However, this information reached the Japanese  
23    Consul General, HAYASHI. However, at that time as a  
24    result of the Captain NAKAMURA Incident the Japanese-  
25    Manchurian-Chinese relations in that area was extremely



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 acute and when Consul General HAYASHI received this  
2 report he was so very much surprised that he sent a  
3 letter to the Commanding General of the Kwantung  
4 Army, HONJO, about the matter but the letter arrived  
5 late. While on the one hand this information was  
6 reported to Tokyo and reached Tokyo, General HONJO  
7 arrived in Mukden on the 19th and there, for the first  
8 time, saw the letter sent to him by HAYASHI which was  
9 sent to him from Port Arthur -- that is, the letter  
10 which had originally been sent to Port Arthur was  
11 relayed on to him to Mukden.

12 Because of the fact of the tense situation  
13 the Japanese Army -- some of the Japanese Army officers  
14 were extremely indignant over the situation in  
15 Manchuria, Consul HAYASHI -- HAYASHI, out of his pre-  
16 conceived notions -- Because of the acute situation  
17 existing in that area at the time, some Japanese Army  
18 officers were extremely indignant and Consul-General  
19 HAYASHI, out of his over-cautiousness had expressed  
20 a desire that these younger officers would not make  
21 any mistakes, and that fact was reported in a very  
22 over-exaggerated form.

23 Q How did you become familiar with that?

24 A After General HONJO had a talk with HAYASHI,  
25 Consul-General HAYASHI, on the 19th he immediately on

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 the same day called Lieutenant Colonel SHIMAMOTO to  
2 investigate the facts. The arrival of our party in  
3 Mukden was on the 20th of September and Chief of Staff  
4 MIYAKE, after familiarizing himself with the contents  
5 of the investigation, took me along and paid a visit  
6 to Consul-General HAYASHI that evening and this matter  
7 was fully explained to the consul-general. And the  
8 same matters were also reported to ANDO, chief of the  
9 Military Service Section dispatched from the War  
10 Ministry.

11 Q Then please testify about the second point,  
12 that is, the point about non-resistance of the Chinese  
13 troops.

14 A At that time Colonel ITAGAKI, at the time of  
15 the outbreak of the Incident, happened to be in Mukden  
16 and had learned from Consul-General HAYASHI that in  
17 as much as the Chinese forces were taking a non-  
18 resistance stand he would like to have that considered  
19 by the Kwantung Army, but in view of the fact that the  
20 fighting had already started nothing could be done about  
21 it and, as a matter of fact, it was considered to be the  
22 old Chinese policy of trying to make our side relax  
23 our vigil by declaring such a policy.

24 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen  
25 minutes.

KATAKURA

DIRECT

Greenberg

1 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was  
2 taken until 1500, after which the proceedings  
3 were resumed as follows:)

4 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
5 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. OKAMOTO.

7 MR. T. OKAMOTO: Will the court reporter  
8 please read the last answer?

9 (Whereupon, the last answer was  
10 read by the official court reporter as  
11 follows:)

12 "A At that time Colonel ITAGAKI, at the time of  
13 the outbreak of the incident, happened to be in Muk-  
14 den and had learned from Consul General HAYASHI that,  
15 inasmuch as the Chinese forces were taking a non-re-  
16 sistance stand, he would like to have that considered  
17 by the Kwantung Army. But, in view of the fact that  
18 the fighting had already started, nothing could be  
19 done about it, and, as a matter of fact, it was con-  
20 sidered to be the old Chinese policy of trying to  
21 make our side relax our vigil by declaring such a  
22 policy."

23 BY MR. T. OKAMOTO (Continued):

24 Q Did you, Mr. Witness, investigate personally  
25 about that matter?

THE MONITOR: Actually investigate.



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1           A    May I add a word just before I reply?

2           Q    Yes.

3           A    And thereupon -- and then Colonel ITAGAKI  
4 requested Colonel ANDO, who had come from the Military  
5 Service Section of the War Ministry, that he  
6 should go to the actual scene of the fighting and  
7 investigate into the situation himself by making  
8 inquiries of company commanders and battalion commanders  
9 who had engaged in the fighting, see the actual  
10 battle field to find out whether the fighting had  
11 broken out despite the so-called non-resistance of  
12 the Chinese or otherwise.

13           Q    Did you say that the person who spoke to  
14 Colonel ANDO about that matter was Colonel ITAGAKI?  
15 Was that right?

16           A    Slight correction of the previous: The  
17 commanding general of the Kwantung Army told Colonel  
18 ANDO to go personally to the scene of the fighting to  
19 see whether that was -- whether the non-resistance  
20 policy of the Chinese was real and actual or whether  
21 there was actual fighting.

22           Q    Then what did Colonel ANDO do?

23           A    Colonel ANDO further inquired into the two  
24 other questions and went to the scene of the situation  
25 to make the investigation -- with regard to those

1 questions which I have previously mentioned.

2 Q Then, will you elaborate on the third  
3 point, the point concerning faulty or arrogant atti-  
4 tude of a certain staff officer?

5 A With respect to the telephone conversation  
6 in which Consul General HAYASHI spoke of the non-  
7 resistance policy of the Chinese side, ITAGAKI was  
8 said to have used such sharp words which gave --  
9 carried an impression of an offensive character.

10 Q Was explanation also made about that matter  
11 to Colonel ANDO then?

12 A Yes, explanations were made.

13 Q Who made the explanations?

14 A Colonel ITAGAKI, himself, in the presence  
15 of General HONJO.

16 Q Well, then, will you please elaborate on the  
17 fourth point, that is to say, the point about the  
18 action -- the fact that action of the Kwantung Army  
19 was taken too swiftly?

20 A Before the outbreak of the incident, be-  
21 cause of the fact that the Kwantung Army consisted  
22 of a rather small force, the policy was that, in the  
23 event of some emergency, that they should carry out  
24 their action by minute and careful operational  
25 planning and a high degree of training of troops.



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 However, as I have said before, at the time of the  
2 outbreak of the incident, the position or attitude  
3 of the commanding general of the Kwantung Army had  
4 twice changed; and, as a matter of fact, the movement  
5 of troops -- and the movement of troops could not be  
6 carried out as desired. And, because of the fact  
7 that preparations and arrangements for troop trans-  
8 portation by railway did not -- could not be made in  
9 a desirable manner, Lieutenant Colonel ISHIHARA,  
10 who was in charge of operations, was very much irri-  
11 tated.

12 Q Then how -- what about the action of the  
13 Fushun company of which you testified a while ago?

14 A This matter was found out as a result of  
15 the investigations conducted on the 19th and the 20th.  
16 Captain KAWAKAMI, after hearing the results of the  
17 second investigation party pertaining to the Captain  
18 NAKAMURA Incident, felt much relieved when he found  
19 out that there was not much -- the consequences were  
20 not as intense as he had expected; that, on the night  
21 of the 18th, when an emergency muster was called, he  
22 ran to the -- he went to the point of muster hurriedly  
23 without even carrying his binoculars.

24 Q Was that report made to Colonel ANDO, Chief  
25 of the Military Service Section; is that right?

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1       A    In addition to submitting this report to  
2 Colonel ANDO, the request was made that he, person-  
3 ally, make an investigation on the actual spot.

4       Q    Then what did Colonel ANDO do?

5       A    Before that, the commander-in-chief of the  
6 Kwantung Army had a legal investigation on the spot  
7 conducted, and the report thereof was made to  
8 Colonel ANDO.

9       Q    Those who are in charge at the time -- at  
10 the time the report was made, are those who are in  
11 charge at the time this report was made still alive?

12       THE MONITOR: Was the party responsible for  
13 making the report still alive?

14       A    At that time the Kwantung Army despatched  
15 OYAMA, Chief of the Legal Affairs Section, Lieut-  
16 enant Colonel USUDA, Kanzo, Lieutenant Colonel  
17 SHIMAMOTO, Military Police, and others, and medical  
18 officers, all of whom constituted an investigating  
19 party. As far as I am concerned, I think that  
20 OYAMA and SHIMAMOTO are still alive today.

21       Q    How about Colonel ANDO?

22       A    I think Colonel ANDO is dead.

23       Q    When did Colonel ANDO return to Tokyo?

24       A    Colonel ANDO investigated the spot quite  
25 thoroughly for about four days and returned to Tokyo

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 on the 27th.

2 Q Then, do you know anything about the  
3 independence movement which existed in the Kirin  
4 Province and that the Kirin Province became independ-  
5 ent?

6 A Yes, I do know.

7 Q Will you state briefly what you know about  
8 it?

9 A At that time there was, in Kirin, Hsi Hsia,  
10 Chief of Staff of the Kirin Army, as representative --  
11 as the representative of Chang Tso-hsiang.

12 Q Is Hsi Hsia Manchurian or Chinese?

13 A It is evident by the fact that his name  
14 consists of only two Chinese characters, Hsi Hsia,  
15 he was Manchurian and not Chinese.

16 Q Was he a relative -- was he a blood relative  
17 of any sort with Emperor Hsiun Tung?

18 A Yes, he is a relation.

19 Q Why did he make his mind up to become  
20 independent?

21 A Hsi Hsia for a long time was an advocate  
22 of the restoration of the monarchy and did not like  
23 to serve under Chang Hsueh-liang; and it appears  
24 that Lo Chen-yu went to Kirin to contact Hsi Hsia  
25 after the outbreak of the incident.



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1           Q   Under what circumstances did the witness  
2 become familiar with the actions of Lo Chen-yu?

3           A   I think it was around the 22nd or the 23rd  
4 of September that Lo Chen-yu went to Mukden and met  
5 Colonel ITAGAKI. And, after contacting Hsi Hsia in  
6 Kirin -- after Lo Chen-yu contacted Hsi Hsia in  
7 Kirin and Chang Hai-peng of Taonan, he returned to  
8 Mukden after a few days. His talk after his return  
9 from his trip was that he had found that Hsi Hsia was  
10 already -- had already made preparations for inde-  
11 pendence and that he desired to call Emperor Hsiun  
12 Tung to Kirin and that he, himself, Lo Chen-yu, was  
13 going to Tientsin to call the Emperor Hsiun Tung in  
14 person and left Mukden for Tientsin by way of Dairen.  
15 Hsi Hsia was in Kirin; and, although Chang Hai-peng  
16 was absent, he consulted his own group -- Chinese  
17 group -- and, after consulting Chang Hai-peng's group  
18 at the end of September, he issued an independence  
19 declaration.

20           Q   Was the witness present when Lo Chen-yu met  
21 Colonel ITAGAKI?

22           A   No. But ITAGAKI -- Colonel ITAGAKI told me  
23 about the conversation. And then I drafted a telegram  
24 to the central authorities incorporating the gist  
25 of that conversation.

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 Q Was any reply received -- instruction re-  
2 ceived from Tokyo about it?

3 A The Vice-Minister of War sent telegraphic  
4 instructions saying that the Kwantung Army should  
5 not take part in any way with such movements as the  
6 monarchical restoration movement in Manchuria. That  
7 was toward the end of September.

8 Q Did the Kwantung Army act in accordance with  
9 the instructions for -- from the central army  
10 authorities or otherwise?

11 A For the purpose of obtaining intelligence  
12 reports, various contacts were made. But, the  
13 Kwantung Army did not directly participate in the  
14 movement.

15 Q Will you explain more fully about the ex-  
16 change of information?

17 A It means assembling various reports --  
18 intelligence reports from various sources.

19 Q Were you connected in your official capacity  
20 with the task of assembling intelligence reports?

21 A I did not participate directly. My duty  
22 was to bring together and put into concise form the  
23 information obtained.

24 Q What is the distance between Kirin and  
25 Mukden? It is all right if you don't remember it.



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 A I think about four hundred kilometres.

2 Q Were there any other generals -- cases  
3 where other generals proclaimed independence in  
4 other regions?

5 A General Chang Hai-peng proclaimed indepen-  
6 dence on the 1st of October in Taonan. Then, at a  
7 place called Shangchenchen, which is about two  
8 hundred to two hundred-fifty kilometres from Mukden,  
9 at a point midway between Mukden and Kirin, General  
10 Yu Chih-shan proclaimed independence.

11 Q What is the distance between Taonan and  
12 Mukden?

13 A About four hundred-fifty kilometres as the  
14 crow flies.

15 Q Had the Kwantung Army had its troops  
16 stationed at Taonan or Shangchenchen or any other  
17 places -- despatch troops to either of these two  
18 places?

19 A As far as the Kwantung Army is concerned,  
20 no troops were despatched at that time.

21  
22  
23  
24  
25

KATAKURA

DIRECT

D  
u  
d  
a  
&  
W  
h  
a  
l  
e  
n

1 Q Did the Kwantung Army ever finance those  
2 independence movements or autonomous movements by  
3 Manchurian generals -- instead of "finance" offer  
4 financial or monetary contributions?

5 A That special fund which was available for  
6 any such purposes, available to the Kwantung Army  
7 as a whole at that time was no more than fifty  
8 thousand yen annually. And as a matter of fact the  
9 Kwantung Army was at a loss because it had no money  
10 to spend for any such purposes.

11 Q Spending money for that purpose, by the  
12 words "spend money for that purpose" do you mean to  
13 say that spend money for the purpose of independence  
14 movement -- supporting the independence movement?

15 A There was not a cent to be spent for such  
16 purposes as independence movement because the special  
17 fund was available only for covering expenses for the  
18 gathering of intelligence, the cost of patrolling,  
19 and for various reception purposes.

20 At that time we asked for the assistance and  
21 support of the South Manchuria Railway and others,  
22 but as a matter of fact they helped us with their  
23 own private funds, not at our expense, that is, the  
24 personnel and staff members of the S.M.R.

25 Q Then what field, or in what branches, did

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 the staff members of the South Manchuria Railway help  
2 the Kwantung Army?

3 A In connection with transportation matters,  
4 and matters pertaining to the preservation of law and  
5 order.

6 Q Did the South Manchuria Railway ever use by  
7 order -- did the Kwantung Army ever use the private  
8 parties or staff members of the South Manchuria Rail-  
9 way for the purpose of independence or autonomous move-  
10 ments by order?

11 A One or two persons were dispatched for pur-  
12 poses of contact and liaison, but they were never  
13 utilized for the purpose of such a movement.

14 Q What attitude did the Kwantung Army assume  
15 towards the independent movements of which you testi-  
16 fied?

17 A In view of the policy laid down by the cen-  
18 tral authorities, the Kwantung Army on its own part  
19 placed special emphasis on the preservation of law  
20 and order. The attitude taken by the Kwantung Army  
21 with respect to the various independent movements  
22 in the various areas of Manchuria under various leaders  
23 was silent watch -- was one of watchful silence, and  
24 to contact these parties after these independence  
25 movements matured.



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1           Q   Was there any general at that time by the  
2 name of General Ma Chan-shan in Manchuria -- a Man-  
3 churian general by the name of Ma Chan-shan?

4           A   At the outset of the Manchurian Incident  
5 he was at Heiho as the third brigade commander.

6           Q   Does the witness know anything about the  
7 actions of General Ma Chan-shan?

8           A   I am familiar.

9           Q   Please state briefly what you know.

10          A   The capital of Heilungkiang Province at  
11 that time was Tsitsihar, and the governor of that  
12 province was Wan Fu-lin. At the time of the outbreak  
13 of the incident this person was in North China. In  
14 his absence his business was looked after by his son,  
15 Wan Kuo-pin.

16               At about that time we acquired at the Chinese  
17 barracks in Mukden the Chinese code, and, therefore,  
18 as a result it became easy to intercept coded Chinese  
19 messages. According to information received from such  
20 decoded messages we learned that Wan Fu-lin was very  
21 much anxious to have Chang Hsueh-liang return to  
22 Manchuria -- to Heilungkiang. His son, Wan Kuo-pin,  
23 was very much apprehensive lest Chang Hei-ping might  
24 come to Heilungkiang with the Japanese supporting  
25 him from behind.

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 THE INTERPRETER: In the previous reply  
2 Heilungkiang should read Tsitsihar.

3 A (Continuing) But it appears as if the  
4 people in the Tsitsihar area had received information  
5 that the Japanese were not coming, and, therefore,  
6 the popular support of Chang Hei-ping became strong.  
7 However, because Wan Fu-lin thought that his son,  
8 Wan Kuo-Pin, was too weak to handle the situation,  
9 he called Ma Chan-shan to Tsitsihar and appointed him  
10 commander of the forces of Heilungkiang.

11 Q Your testimony up to now has been a bit too  
12 detailed. Would you make it more brief in the future.

13 Was there any case of a clash between  
14 Ma Chan-shan and Chang Hei-ping somewhere?

15 A Yes, there was a clash between the two parties  
16 at Nun-kiang.

17 Q Although it is slightly out of order chrono-  
18 logically, I shall ask you this: Are you aware of the  
19 fact that after the foundation of the state of Man-  
20 chukuo Ma Chan-shan became Minister of War?

21 A He became what might be called Director-  
22 General of Military Administration by concurrently  
23 holding the posts of War Minister and Chief of  
24 Staff.

25 Q Do you know anything about the circumstances



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 leading up to the appointment of Ma Chan-shan as  
2 Minister of War of Manchukuo -- Minister of Military  
3 Administration?

4 A I do.

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 Q Please explain briefly.

2 A Toward the end of November, Ma Chan-shan,  
3 as the result of a military clash with the Japanese  
4 Army, was defeated in the field and retreated to the  
5 north of Harbin to a place called Hailun. At that  
6 time, Colonel ITAGAKI, of the Kwantung Army, went  
7 along to Hailun and there obtained an interview with  
8 Ma Chan-shan. After Colonel ITAGAKI had explained to  
9 Ma Chan-shan the real and true intentions of the  
10 Japanese, Han Yun-chieh and Chao Chung-jen persuaded  
11 him to accept the position. At that time, Chang  
12 Chin-hui was in Harbin, and he made very strong efforts  
13 to obtain Ma Chan-shan as provincial governor of  
14 Heilungkiang, and later on, toward the end of Feb-  
15 ruary 1932, he was appointed to the post of Minister  
16 of Military Administration at the time of the con-  
17 ference held for the establishment of the new state.

18 Q Now I will change the subject. Are you  
19 aware of the fact there was a riot in Japan in  
20 connection with the so-called October Incident?

21 A Yes, in outline form.

22 Q How did you come to know it?

23 A On October 18, a message came from Tokyo  
24 to the effect that the Kwantung Army should not take  
25 such action such as to become independent of the Japanese

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 Army in Japan. That was the day when KAWAGISHI,  
2 Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor, was to deliver a message  
3 of the Japanese Emperor to the Japanese troops in  
4 Mukden. Inasmuch as the transmission of the Imperial  
5 message to the Japanese forces in Mukden was a very  
6 important matter, and realizing that it was highly  
7 improper to show such a telegram suspecting the  
8 movements and attitude of the Kwantung Army to the  
9 commander-in-chief at a time when he was to partici-  
10 pate in the ceremony, believing that it would shake  
11 his confidence, I delayed the presentation of that  
12 telegram.

13 At the time of the transmission of the  
14 Imperial message which I showed--

15 THE INTERPRETER: The witness' reply was not  
16 clear enough to permit interpretation. We are asking  
17 him to repeat.

18 A (Continuing) At the time I showed the  
19 telegram to the effect that an Imperial message was  
20 to be transmitted had come from Tokyo to General  
21 HONJO, I also heard from the various army units in  
22 the field that a similar telegram had been received  
23 from Tokyo, and, therefore, we immediately set upon  
24 investigating. But in the Kwantung Army there is no  
25 result of the investigation because there was nothing.



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1           On the day before, that is, October 17, a  
2 telegram arrived with the report that a part of the  
3 younger officers had been apprehended in Tokyo for some  
4 action. Commander-in-Chief HONJO, of the Kwantung  
5 Army, in view of the fact that a very small, numerically  
6 small force of the Kwantung Army had made great efforts  
7 since the outbreak of the incident, wrote a message  
8 to the chief of the Army General Staff and to the  
9 War Minister, explaining the actual situation in the  
10 Kwantung Army so that the central army authorities  
11 would know the real situation.

12           Q   Did anyone come from Tokyo at that time for  
13 investigation?

14           A   Yes.

15           Q   Who was it?

16           A   General SHIRAKAWA, Yoshinori, member of the  
17 Supreme War Council.

18           Q   Why did General SHIRAKAWA come for investi-  
19 gation?

20           A   General SHIRAKAWA came because of a feeling  
21 that something might happen or something was in the  
22 offing. But while en route to Manchuria, he found out  
23 that there was nothing to investigate as far as the  
24 Kwantung Army was concerned, and therefore did not  
25 conduct any investigation.

KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 Q Do you know a Manchurian by the name of  
2 Yu Chung-han?

3 A Yes, I do.

4 Q What is he?

5 A He was one of the foremost and leading civil  
6 officials in Manchuria, together with Wang Yung-chiang  
7 and Yuan Chin-kai.

8 Q Did Yu Chung-han ever visit General HONJO?

9 A Yes, on the 3d of November --

10 THE INTERPRETER: Correction from the witness:  
11 On the 3d of November, that is to say, the Meiji  
12 Commemoration Day, he came to Mukden and met HONJO  
13 for the first time.

14 Q Did you attend the meeting and hear the con-  
15 versation between Yu Chung-han and General HONJO?

16 A No, I was not present at the conversation,  
17 but I heard of its contents from Colonel ITAGAKI, and  
18 also I saw the document which was tendered by  
19 Yu Chung-han at that time.

20 Q What attitude did General HONJO take with  
21 respect to the independence movement of Mr. Yu Chung-han?

22 A Of the points mentioned by Yu Chung-han to  
23 General HONJO, there were two important points.  
24 Point one was, now that the incident had developed to  
25 such a state, in order to preserve and maintain the



KATAKURA

DIRECT

1 security and well-being and law and order in the  
2 northeastern area, this area should be separated from  
3 the Nanking Government, and that a new country founded  
4 upon the kingly way should be established. In  
5 establishing an area under the principle of the kingly  
6 way in the northeastern area, the principle should be  
7 adopted of cultivating no soldiery, that is, an anti-  
8 military principle, and also to establish and observe  
9 the principle of non-menace and non-aggression, and,  
10 on the basis of these principles, to establish a  
11 Monroe society.

12 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until  
13 half-past nine on Monday morning.

14 (Whereupon, at 1600 an adjournment  
15 was taken until Monday, 24 March 1947, at  
16 0930.)

17 - - - -  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25